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Editorial
Britain's predicament
For the past four years the major industrial
OECD countries have been in the throes of a
crisis brought to a head by the oil price rises of
1973-74, but arising from longer-run difficulties
which had already begun to appear by the late
1960s. The crisis is by no means over. The
situation of the economically stronger countries
such as the USA, Japan and West Germany
seems to be on the upturn but the recovery of
others including Britain is still very much in
doubt. With increasing oil output, Britain's
balance of payments is rapidly improvingbut
this is far from a sufficient condition for dealing
with unemployment, stagnation in key sectors,
regional imbalance, low productivity and decline
or collapse in the social services. And in any
case the issues for Britain are not simply economic,
but involve also social and political problems
which recession has sharpened: the difficulties of
coming to terms with Scottish, Welsh and Irish
nationalism; racial conflict; political violence;
persistent poverty; the erosion of the welfare
state; and corruption and decay in our police and
local government bureaucracies.
A time of crisis presents both dangers and
opportunities, bringing into sharp relief difficulties
which previously escaped notice, but possibly
also creating conditions in which to seek for
more fundamental solutions. The dangers are, of
course, increased if British economic policy
ignores the deeper problems (as several of our
contributors argue) and concentrates on short-run
symptoms rather than long-run causes; seeks
solutions primarily by aiming at rates of GNP
growth (the 5 per cent endorsed both by the
NEDC and the OECD) which are unrealistic in
present circumstances, beyond anything Britain
has achieved in the past and which fail to deal
with the structural causes underlying our current
difficulties (Richard Jolly); is unable to look
beyond the problems and instruments of short-run
demand management (B. S. Minhas); believes
that if only we could control the money supply or
(alternatively) if only we could make incomes
policy stick our difficulties would be over; or
places too much faith in the ability of legislation
to settle difficult problems such as race relations
or regional devolution; or succumbs to the almost
millenarian faith that our troubles will be calmed
by North Sea oil.
The danger is equally one of responding too
narrowly to our international predicament. The
conventional debate between policies of free
trade with deflation or import control with
expansion poses the issues far too starkly for
either analysis or prescription. This debate largely
ignores the real costs of metsures aimed at
solving our difficulties in the short-run but in
ways which in the long-run would tend to
maintain inappropriate patterns of international
specialisation or damage the fragile economies of
our Third World neighbours: such as allowing
technological advance to proceed without any
sense of long-run world industrial balance, let
alone the employment or other human costs; or
restricting imports of cheap manufactures from
the poorer countries without adequate considera-
tion of the opportunities for mutual adjustment;
or promoting our arms exports to developing
countries (Mary Kaldor); or imposing and
administering immigration restrictions in such a
way as to harm race relations in our own country
and damage relations with (and exports to) several
important countries in the Third World.
The relevance of development studies
It is with some trepidation that we undertake in
this issue of the Bulletin to analyse some of these
dangers and to call attention to some of the
opportunities which lie beyond them. Most of us1
lack direct experience, except in our capacity as
citizens and residents, in dealing with British
problems. Further, the direct analogy between
Britain and the developing countries is, as most
of our contributors point out, rather suspect.
To be sure, there are many similarities: structural
unemployment, inflation and balance of payments
difficulties; the emigration of professional man-
power; the visiting experts from the IMF; regional
imbalance and the difficulty of inducing invest-
ment and expansion. But even if we hold these
in common they indicate shared features
of underdevelopment, rather than comparable
patterns of development.
And the differences are critical. We are, after all,
an industrial country and many of our problems
are those of over-development or the wrong kind
of development, for instance: an agricultural
sector that is too small and overspecialised
i From this caveat we should excejst some of our distinguished
contributors from outside the IDS: Stuart Holland, Barbara
Ward, Mary Kaldor, Brian Johnson and Michael Allaby.
(Brian Johnson); wasteful methods of energy
production and use (Barbara Ward); disease
patterns created by stress, lack of exercise and
overconsumption (Michael Lipton); and over-
specialisation in highly complex defence and
aerospace technology (Mary Kaldor). We are still
(though decreasingly so) an exporter of technology
and culture, including, as Richard Batley and
Alan Rew point out, our new town housing
policy. We still have large investments abroad
(Stuart Holland) and remain the home base of
several of the larger multi-national corporations,
including some operating in the Third World.2
Nevertheless we believe that the analytical
approaches of 'development studies' can suggest
new ways of studying Britain's admittedly
different problems. For a variety of reasons-
cogently explained by Osvaldo Sunkel in a
previous issue of the IDS Bulletin (vol. 8, no. 3,
March, 1977)planners and social scientists
working in developing countries became aware of
the inadequacy of policies based on the conven-
tional methods of analysis well before the present
crisis raised doubts about them in the major
industrial countries. As both B. S. Minhas and
Stuart Holland point out below, monetary policy
and Keynesian demand management are simply
not workable in most developing countries; and
the prime emphasis of economic policy has
always been on the structure of production or
supply. The inadequacy of growth in GNP as
the prime objective of development policy with
little regard for distribution, employment, welfare
and structural change became ever clearer during
the period of relatively high growth rates in the
developing countries in the 1960s. (Paradoxically,
at about the same time Britain was beginning to
give more emphasis to growth in her economic
policy and somewhat less than before to welfare
and full employment.) Moreover those in
development studies have long become used to
the idea that significant improvements may come
only through major structural change, often
accompanied by acute social conflict. And finally,
the vulnerability of Third World countries to
external economic and political pressures has
made us increasingly aware of the consequences
of international dependence and of the need for
self-reliant strategies of development.
In none of these respects is a 'development
approach' completely new, nor is it narrowly
confined to 'developing countries'. Indeed, as
2 The implications of Britain as a base for multinational
operations were explained in a paper by Paul Kesterton and
Paul Spray prepared for a Workshop on Britain andDevelopment at which several of the papers in this Bulletin
were discussed.
Dudley Seers argues so persuasively, the intel-
lectual division of labour between development
studies and othei social sciences becomes
increasingly difficult to define. But we believe
that the issues have been posed earlier and
somewhat more sharply in countries at the
periphery than in the industrialised centres of
Europe and North America.
Further, those of us who argue that rapid growth
and industrialisation do not necessarily bring
development in the Third World can readily
identify parallels in the over-industrialisation of
Britain, a convergence which is brought out most
clearly in the sectoral papers by Michael Lipton,
Alan Rew and Richard Batley, Brian Johnson and
Michael Allaby, and Barbara Ward. Redistribu-
tion, alternative cultures and lifestyles, small units
of production and consumption rather than large,
decentralisation and self-reliance; these are all
themes which emerge both in the development
literature and in blueprints for change in Britain.
One of the most troublesome aspects of developing
a conservationist, self-reliant strategy of change
in Britain is dealing with its possible implications
for trade and other transactions with the Third
World. This is considered carefully in the paper
by Brian Johnson and Michael Allaby who
contend that the altered (and increased) agri-
cultural production they advocate in the UK
would not require as much adjustment in our
trade with the developing countries as with our
European Common Market partners. It is less
certain whether the same can be said of the case
for energy conservation persuasively explored by
Barbara Ward, which would surely have major
consequences for oil production and prices, at
least if put into effect by other industrial
consumers as well as Britain. Even developing
countries which would otherwise stand to gain
by lower oil prices might view with concern, for
example, any consequent loss in OPEC's
bargaining power vis-a-vis the industrial countries.
This is not to say, however, that adjustment would
be impossible or that the long-run interests of
both energy consuming and energy producing
countries may not be fairly close as Posner
argues in his review of an IDS communications
paper on North Sea Oil. Oil producers the world
over (including Britain) are increasingly worried
about the depletion of their reserves and what
happens to them 'after oil'; for both producers
and consumers have long-run interests in
conservation, however important the differences
between them on timing and short-run adjustment.
Neither Britain's own development, nor that of
the developing countries can be discussed, there-
fore, without taking account of Britain's changing
place in the world economy. This is partly a
matter of history. Britain's emergence as
the major industrial and imperial power and
her subsequent decline have had momentous
consequences for the patterns of development
and underdevelopment established both in the
Third World and in Britain herself. Such
historic links continue to shape events even
when, as Michael Lipton argues itt his book
The Erosion of a Relationship: India and Britain
since 1960 (Lipton & Firm, OUP, 1975)they
are explicitly rejected by both former colony
and former metropolis.3 Ray Crotty forcefully
argues that Ireland's present problems descend
directly from her relationships with Britain in
the past; and that they can only be dealt
with by major changes in the structure of
Irish society, changes which would also require
the restructuring of Ireland's relationships with
Britain. Mary Kaldor suggests that Britain has
specialised excessively in defence and aerospace
technology both in order to maintain her status
as a major military power and to solve, by arms
production and exports, short-run difficulties in
employment and the balance of payments. This
has serious costs in terms of the diversion of
resources and technological innovation from
alternative uses, in terms of our relations with
other arms producing countries and our partici-
pation in the arms race, and in terms of the flow
of arms to the developing countries.
To a large extent historic connections between
Britain and the Third World are being trans-
formed by new international influences including
the expansion and transformation of the world
economic system, the growing power and resources
of the multinational corporations, the emergence
of the socialist bloc and the cold war and the
increasing integration of certain leading Third
World exporters into the manufacturing structure
of world production. The problems posed in
Britain are not dissimilar to those affecting
the developing countries; the decline in our
international economic bargaining power due
to our lack of competitiveness and recurrent
balance of payments difficulties, and the
problem of making the activities of multi-
national corporations compatible with national
economic strategies (Stuart Holland). In some
ways, however, we are less vulnerable than the
developing countries. Foreign multinational
corporations invest heavily in the UK, Britain
3 Lipton's argument is that India overreacted by cutting links
with Britain even more than self-interest alone would
dictate; parallels in Britain's reactions to its former Empire
are not hard to find.
herself is the home base of several multinational
corporations with extensive investments abroad
(though this may not be as much of an advantage
as it looks, given that even 'British' multinational
corporations would not find it difficult to relocate
if things became difficult for them in the UK).
We export more arms than we import. We rely
on doctors from Sri Lanka, India and other
developing countries as well as exporting them
to the USA, Canada or Australia. In other
respects, however, (especially militarily as Mary
Kaldor observes) we may depend more heavily
upon our NATO and EEC partners than
developing countries like Iran or India do upon,
say, the USA or the USSR. Although the precise
nature of our international predicament and the
way we cope with it differs from that of countries
in the Third World, we have as much to learn
from them as they do from us.
From theory to practice
It is one thing to advocatelike most of the
papers in this Bulletina less growth-oriented,
more self-reliant strategy of change in Britain.
It is quite another to put it into effect. Several
of our contributors begin by looking at the
changes necessary in one sector, but end up with
a far broader set of prescriptions cutting across
a number of different areas. Alan Rew and
Richard Batley, for example, criticise "welfare
monism" and argue that housing and welfare
policy cannot be considered separately from its
interrelation with urban growth, industrial pro-
duction and employment. Barbara Ward's pro-
posals for the conservation of energy would
involve changes in transport policy, methods of
agricultural production, housing, employment and
probably defence. Michael Lipton suggests that
a comprehensive strategy of health care would
include alterations in education, patterns of work
and leisure, sport, transport and habits of con-
sumption such as smoking and the fiscal policies
affecting them. All in all our contributors make
a persuasive case for comprehensive rather than
piecemeal approaches to our problems. Neverthe-
less they differ in that some of them (in particular
Michael Lipton) seem to envisage changes in one
sector setting off a wave of 'spread effects' else-
where; while others (like Stuart Holland) offer
more broadly based strategies for national
recovery.
Anyone who has worked in development studies
or for that matter any other policy science-
is aware of the difficulty of moving between the
analysis of problems, prescriptions for déaling with
them and back again to assessment of the con-
ditions under which they can (or cannot) be
implemented. The difficulties posed can be seen
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most sharply in relation to the imaginary speech
by a Minister of Health which Michael Lipton
uses as the vehicle for his arguments. Under what
circumstances might a British Minister of Health
actually deliver such a speech and what response
(derision or delight?) would it get from his
colleagues? How easy would it be to buy off the
vested interests he talks about? How would one
deal with the vested interests of the medical pro-
fession? Would the combination of incentives and
alterations in legislation really bring major
changes in the structure of health care? How
might British politicians hoping to bring about
such radical changes win support for their views
from those whom Lipton regards as being at the
unimaginative centre of the British political spec-
trum? Would a "non-partisan" approach to health
or any other major issue of social concern-
necessarily be the best way of bringing this about?
Under what circumstances could politicians
develop the vision, leadership and support to intro-
duce such fundamental changes in the approach
to health or to any other sector, which an alterna-
tive development strategy involves? And what are
the conditions for such changes to be followed
through in other sectors as well? Does the present
crisis create the conditions under which the
necessary political support could be mobilised
for change? How much dissatisfaction with
existing conditionsunemployment, declining real
incomes, deterioration in social servicesis
needed? How could this dissatisfaction be mobil-
ised and what are the main political obstacles that
would be encountered?
Such questions are all the more necessary because
even our practising politicians tend to discuss
their policies mainly in terms of economic
desirability without assessing (or perhaps
deliberately preferring to ignore) their possible
political repercussions. As a former economic
adviser to the government recently put it in The
Times:
All economic analysis in this field has to assume
that the Government is in a position to enforce
the policy recommendede.g. that a monetarist
Government will remain in power however
much unemployment turns out to be needed to
pre'zent wage and price escalation, or that an
incomes-policy Government will be willing to
face and win a confrontation with a powerful
union determined to break the rules. Only a
visionary optimist would claim today, as you
seem to be doing about monetary policy, or as
advocates of income policy such as myself have
done in the past, that there is any likelihood of
either of the main parties being willing to face
enough unemployment, or enough confron-
tation, to make it credible to the trade unions
that they can and will carry out their policy.4
Nor is it always easy to circumvent the adminis-
trative obstacles to change. In their article on
urban housing, Alan Rew and Richard Batley
suggest that planning and bureaucratic decisions
have tended to 'redistribute' social problemsto
other people, to other agencies or to other sectors
instead of solving them. This is typical of a
situation in which changes are mainly seen as
being introduced from the top by politicians,
planners and civil servants.5 Although most of
us advocate more participatory styles of develop-
ment, there is not enough discussion in this
Bulletin of the way participation itself can gen-
erate the momentum for balanced change; ex-
cept by Stuart Holland who also comes closest to
spelling out the particular British groups he thinks
are most likely to press for reform. Yet even he
gives too little attention to the conflicts from which
changes are most likely to arise, to the necessary
process of mobilising political support and to the
methods by which genuine control over the
national economy might in practice be secured.
Any strategy for major change in British society
would also have to consider how the necessary
international adjustments could be ensured: for
example the modifications in our links with
NATO implied in Mary Kaldor's proposals for
cutting back our arms production and military
spending; or the revisions of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy of the European Common Market
which would permit the kind of decentralisation
and diversification of agricultural production
proposed by Brian Johnson; or the international
trade adjustments both with the industrial coun-
tries of the OECD and with the developing
countries that would be made necessary by struc-
tural changes in our own economy. The adverse
international pressures might be considerable-
the more so given the recent reinforcement of
international economic dependence. Yet we need
not assume that the room for international
manoeuvre is completely blocked.6 Enough dis-
satisfaction with the workings of the world
economy has been expressed in recent yearsto
show that other countries, too, not merely in the
Third World, have recognised the need for reform
in its operations. A new assessment is badly
needed in order to distinguish the real inter-
4 Letter from Lord Roberthall to The Times, September 16,
1977.
S It may sometimes, however, also be typical of a decentralised
approach, in which local groups take initiatives in solving
local problems as they see them.
6 See, for example, the discussion in IDS Bulletin, Vol 7,
No. 4, on UNCTAD IV.
national constraints from those which are merely
manipulated to protect vested interests in our
own society from necessary change.
Such an assessment would also enable us to
identify possible international sources of support
for our new position, some of these, perhaps,
from outside the inner circle' of the industrial
OECD countries, in the countries of the Third
World whose interests on some issues we share.
All this is to say that both social scientists and
practical planners need to give much more thought
to how fundamental changes in strategy can be
made politically and administratively feasible, in
the rich countries as much as in the Third World.
Making realistic proposals for structural change
is a difficult task in any societynot least our
own. But in many areas it is the starting point for
the international changes in which much of the
advance in the poorer countries of the Third
World will depend.
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